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Nation-Building in the Penumbra: 
Notes from a Liminal Statet 
By MONICA EPPINGER* 
I. Landscape Littered with Fallen Giants 
The Soviet Union: Second World, workers' vanguard, Evil 
Empire, home. In the eyes of the West, the Soviet Union was 
decidedly "other," tragic, romantic, or threatening in its radical 
alterity. For Ukrainians, by its end, the Soviet Union was the taken­
for-granted setting of everyday life. The Ukrainian S.S.R. was one of 
the core Soviet republics, in on the Revolution from inception to 
stagnation, birthplace of Trotsky and Brezhnev. Part of the Soviet 
heartland, it was separated from the West by an Iron Curtain and an 
entire Warsaw Pact of buffer states: Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and East Germany. 
These Cold War structures, seemingly stable as late as 1989, 
proved otherwise over the following fifteen years. Ukraine came to 
occupy an uncomfortable middle ground through a series of 
unexpected events. In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved with 
remarkable tranquility when elites from Ukraine and other republics 
t Remarks from The West and the Rest in Comparative Law, 2008 Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of Comparative Law, University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law (Oct. 2-4, 2008). Presented in the panel, What do the 
Rest Think of the West? 
* Joint degree candidate, Ph.D./J.D., in the Department of Anthropology, U.C. 
Berkeley and Yale Law School. A U.S. diplomat from 1992-2001, she developed 
regional expertise in the former Soviet Union through postings to U.S. Embassy in 
Kiev and to the Secretary of State's Office for the New Independent States. In Kiev, 
she covered the Ukrainian Parliament and the post-Soviet transition process, and 
drafted the State Department's 1996 Country Human Rights Report on Ukraine. In 
Washington, as member of an interagency working group for strategic energy 
diplomacy, Monica Eppinger authored policy for the Secretaries of State, Defense, 
Energy, and Commerce and represented the U.S. in negotiations at the Ministerial 
level in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. 
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created independent states by agreement with Moscow. By 2001, 
both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") and the 
European Union ("EU") encompassed the former Warsaw Pact up 
to Ukraine's western border. In 2004, the Ukrainian populace 
astonished the world (and itself) by staging a peaceful uprising 
against rigged elections and a leadership hand-picked by the 
Kremlin. This "Orange Revolution" eschewed the red of the past 
and aligned Ukraine neither with the red of the Russian flag to the 
East nor with the blue of the NATO or EU flags to the West. The 
Orange Revolution, while marking a milestone in the widening gap 
separating Ukraine from its Soviet past, did not expunge surviving 
Soviet habits, assumptions, buildings, and personnel. At the same 
time, although still separated by a slim border from encroaching 
Western military and economic organizations, foreign institutions -
multiparty democracy, private property ownership, a market 
economy - have advanced across Ukraine, apparently inexorably, to 
occupy the present. In this uncomfortable shifted ground, legal 
reform has become a primary technology for sorting out the present 
and charting a path to the future. 
The emergence of post-Socialist legal orders is reshaping some 
of the familiar terrain of comparative legal studies. This new 
context calls into question the topography of comparison and a 
problematic legacy of naming and framing. Vast re-codification 
efforts stand at the center of nation-building projects that seem more 
of a late nineteenth-century Europe than an early twenty-first­
century East. Such changes, and the rupture from which they 
emerge, challenge essentialist or static notions of identity, 
correlations of territory and culture, and assumptions of where the 
West is or where the Rest begin. Based on fourteen months of 
fieldwork in Ukraine, this paper reports on how Ukrainians 
comprehend "the West." Concepts from anthropology, "liminality" 
and "deixis," aid in understanding Ukrainians' ideas of what or 
where "the West" is. Examples from Ukrainian legal reform and 
observations by Ukrainian legal actors lead us to reconsider 
hegemony, integration, mimesis, and agency. 
II. Locating the West 
The question, "What do the Rest think of the West?" presumes 
the salience of some categories that my fieldwork in Ukraine flagged 
as suspect. This suspicion was borne out by the immediate reactions 
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of Ukrainian interlocutors to the question. "What do we think of 
'the West?!' You know we don't think in those old categories 
anymore,"1 was a typical reaction. Ukrainian elites were eager to 
demonstrate that even ordinary citizens no longer think of "the 
West" as a monolith, a view discredited as unsophisticated Cold 
War thinking. Even the most unworldly Ukrainians, I was assured, 
now distinguish between Europe and "America." 
This differentiation came about, in part, when opinions of the 
United States fell precipitously after the onset of the U.S. war in 
Iraq. Those who had doubted Soviet information about the U.S. now 
doubted their doubts. How many of the preposterous-sounding old 
accounts of U.S. human rights violations, class oppression, and 
international adventurism were actually to be believed? Others who 
had doubted altruism as a motive for the NATO bombing of parts of 
the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s found their suspicions of U.S. 
warmongering confirmed by the war in Iraq. "The West," 
previously identified within the geography of Soviet teleology as an 
area enmeshed in a certain stage of bourgeois capitalism, was no 
longer a monolith at which Ukrainians directed revile or envy. The 
U.S. emerged as an object of Ukrainian disregard and sank in public 
consciousness. 
By contrast, Europe ("Evropa") is a constant referent in 
contemporary Ukraine. A most common use is the expression 
"Evroremont," which is contemporary slang for renovating (say, 
one's apartment) to a level of comfort and aesthetic appeal that 
would pass in Europe. Another compound word, a common form 
in which indexing shows up, is "Evrostandardti," a term of art for 
legal, regulatory, or ethical standards either borrowed from Europe 
or perceived to be up to European snuff. Factories are retooled to 
"Evrostandardti," foods are processed to meet "Evrostandardti," 
auditing processes adapted so that companies comply with the 
"Evrostandardti" of potential investors prior to an initial public 
offering ("IPO"). The lousy food stand across the street from my 
apartment selling tough chicken billed itself as the "Evrogrill." 
While the Western press stereotypes Eastern Ukraine as "pro-
1. Telephone interview with Ihor Pryamoyevych, Member of Parliament of 
Ukraine 1994-2002 (Sept. 7, 2008). (N.B.: Per common practice in anthropology, 
throughout this article pseudonyms are used to protect the identities of 
interlocutors. Interviews did happen in date, location, and format noted. The 
author keeps on file the original recording or manuscript of each interview.) 
776 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 32:2 
Russian" and Western Ukraine as "pro-Western," Ukrainians 
regardless of region, age, or social class were keen to explain that all 
aspired to a European standard of living for Ukraine. Despite 
divergent views on geopolitical tactics or strategic alliances, 
Ukrainians find consensus on that. While we could inquire into 
what this pervasive referent of popular culture means, perhaps the 
more interesting question is what does its pervasiveness mean? 
While the U.S. lies outside of the domain of Ukrainian self­
identification, Europe is firmly in Ukrainian sites. Reorienting our 
line of inquiry accordingly, we acknowledge that addressing the 
question of "How does the Rest see the West?" from a Ukrainian 
point of view requires that first we consider the prior question of 
where those in Ukraine locate themselves. That informs how 
Ukrainian legal elites see the West, and how the West and its forms 
are reshaping the legal landscape in Ukraine. The present study 
follows Edward Said,2 who attuned us to the work that "the Orient" 
has done in the internal construction of "Europe," and Laura Nader, 
who alerted us to methodological implications of comparison.3 
Inquiry into what Ukrainians think of "the West" allows us to look 
at ourselves from the viewpoint of those whose state and 
sovereignty are emergent. The fact that Ukraine is a work in 
progress, an object in motion, allows us in the West some insight 
into stable forms in our own context. The Ukrainian position also 
exposes for further scrutiny some of the power relations presumed, 
or replicated, in the concepts of "the West" and "the Rest." 
III. Over there: Ukraine as Outside of the West 
In order to understand how Ukrainians regard the West, the 
concept of deixis is a useful starting point. From linguistic 
anthropology, deixis concerns the way languages encode or 
grammaticalize features of the context of utterance or speech event.4 
Some philosophers refer to deictics as "indexical expressions." 
2. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (Random House 1978). 
3. Laura Nader, Comparative Consciousness, in ASSESSING CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 84-96 (R. Borofsky, ed., McGraw Hill 1994). 
4. WILLIAM F. HANKS, REFERENTIAL PRACTICE: LANGUAGE AND LIVED SPACE 
AMONG THE MAYA (University of Chigaco Press 1990) [hereinafter HANKS, 
REFERENTIAL PRACTICE). See also WILLIAM F. HANKS, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATIVE 
PRACTICES 161-62 (Westview Press 1996). 
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Peirce calls them "indexical signs" 5 and Russell, "egocentric 
particulars"6 (which Hanks helpfully amends to "sociocentric").7 
Traditional categories of deixis in Western linguistic scholarship are 
person, place, and time. Personal deictics encode the speaker's 
reference to self, others, or third persons neither speaker nor 
addressee, as in the pronouns "I," "you," "they." Place deictics 
encode spatial location relative to the location of the speech event. 
Time deictics encode temporal points relative to when an utterance 
was spoken, as in adverbs of time like "now," "then," "yesterday," 
or "this year," and in verb tense.8 
An investigation into "here," "now," and "us" reveals the 
succinctness with which langue captures and conveys complex 
understandings. The "here and now" proximal zone has the 
appearance of concreteness, but as Hanks demonstrates, that is a 
false appearance. Our ways of understanding and inhabiting the 
proximal zone are far from being simple or natural; an immense 
stock of social knowledge orients action and provides the categories 
in which we delimit the here and now.9 
Other categories of deixis elaborated by later scholars are also 
relevant to our inquiry.10 Discursive deixis refers to portions of the 
unfolding discourse in which the addressee is located. The 
sentence, "Puff, puff, puff: that is what it sounded like," is one 
example. Forms of reference to precedent in judicial decisions or 
legislative history are others. Social markers indicate distinctions 
relative to participant-roles, particularly those between speaker and 
addressee or speaker and some referent. Examples are titles of 
address, forms of vocatives, or second-person familiar versus formal 
pronouns, such as the Ukrainian TH and BH. 
Deixis, then, is intimately associated with discourses of 
inclusion and exclusion, the definition of "we" and "they," whether 
5. C.S. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRmNGS OF PEIRCE: SELECTED WRmNGS 107 0-
Buchler ed., Dover 1955) (1940). 
6. BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH (Routledge 1940). 
7. HANKS, REFERENTIAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 7-8. 
8. Id. at 4-5. 
9. Id. at 7. 
10. See J. Lyons, Deixis and Subjectivity: Loquor, Ergo Sum?, in SPEECH, PLACE, 
AND ACTION: STUDIES IN DEIXIS AND RELATED TOPICS, 101 (R. Javella and w. Klein 
eds., Wiley 1982) and C. Fillmore, Towards a Descriptive Framework for Spatial Deixis, 
in SPEECH, PLACE, AND ACTION: STUDIES IN DEIXIS AND RELATED TOPICS 31 (R. Javella 
and W. Klein eds., Wiley 1982). 
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"you" are one of "us." It encodes social distance. Likewise, it 
signals the context-dependent sense of spatial terms, "here" (where 
we think "we" are) and "there" (where "they" start) and temporal 
terms, "now" (the time of us and our contemporaries) and "then" 
(the time of future and past selves). Some temporal deictics are 
more specific in Ukrainian than in English. Two words translate 
into English as "then," one meaning the past [rn.z:1i, "todi"] and 
other, the future [nOTiM, "potim"]. For Ukrainians, the meaning of 
"we" and "they," or "here" and "there," may shift depending on the 
frame of reference, the "then" of the past or of the future. The 
meaning of these deictics has become problematic because of the 
peculiar situation of the present. 
IV. Time and Place: Liminality and Penumbra 
Decoding deictics in contemporary Ukraine is complicated by a 
historical peculiarity: the context upon which deictics depend for 
meaning has been profoundly disrupted. For Ukrainians 
considering collective identity, part of the problem with locating the 
referent for "here" or "there," or "us" or "them," lies in the very fact 
that the frame of reference became unmoored with the passing of 
the Soviet Union. To understand the kinds of forces exerted on that 
context, anthropological work on forms of change offers the useful 
concept of liminality. The liminal space: this is where Ukrainians 
recognize themselves. 
French folklorist Arnold van Gennep introduced the concept of 
"liminality" in his 1909 analysis of rites de passage.11 By this, he 
meant such ritual processes as initiations, investitures, weddings, 
funerals - in fact, all rites which accompany change of place, state, 
and social position. In rites de passage, Van Gennep identified three 
phases: separation, limen, and re-attachment to a stable or recurrent, 
culturally recognized condition.12 The first and last phases "detach 
ritual subjects from their old places in society and return them, 
inwardly transformed and outwardly changed."13 
11. ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE {Routledge and Kegan Paul 
1960) (1909). 
12. VICTOR TURNER, Variations on a Theme of Liminality, in BLAZING THE TRAIL 48, 
48 (University of Arizona Press 1992) [hereinafter TURNER, Variations]. For Turner's 
discussion of Van Gennep's work, see VICTOR TURNER, Morality and Liminality, in 
BLAZING THE TRAIL 132, 133 (University of Arizona Press 1992) [hereinafter TURNER, 
Morality]. 
13. TURNER, Variations, supra note 12, at 48-49. 
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The middle, or liminal, phase is categorically trickier. "Limen" 
literally means a "threshold," though in some protracted rites it is 
more like a corridor or a tunnel.14 Victor Turner, elaborating on Van 
Gennep' s theme, identifies odd properties associated with this place 
of midtransition, liminality. First is being betwixt and between. The 
liminal state by definition is located between established states of 
politico-jural structure. Those occupying a space of liminality 
"evade ordinary cognitive classification, too, for they are not this or 
that, here or there, one thing or the other."15 They suffer a paradox 
characteristic of liminality, of being "both this and that."16 It is in the 
paradox of being two things at once, that as a result the liminal 
subject is culturally and socially recognized as neither. The 
novitiate is · of both secular and sacred, and thus is neither 
parishoner nor priest. 
A second odd property of liminality is that of existing in a state 
of potentiality. Let's start by comparing the "liminal state" with 
normal affairs in the world of productive forces (such as banks, 
parliaments, law firms, universities). Action to maintain the 
systems and personnel of control of this world takes place in a 
culture's "indicative mood."17 In this linguistic analogy, Turner 
suggests that normal sociocultural processes have to do with what 
most cultures would label as "actual," that is, "existing or 
happening 'in fact,' not merely seeming to be so - pretended, 
imagined, fictitious, or ostensible."18 By contrast, life may also be 
experienced in subjunctive or optative moods. Turner cites 
Webster's definition of "subjunctive": '"designating or of that mood 
of a verb used to express supposition, desire, hypothesis, possibility, 
etc., rather than to state an actual fact."'19 (Similarly, the optative 
mood expresses wish or desire.) "The liminal or central phase of 
elaborate ritual," Turner concludes, "is clearly dominated by the 
subjunctive mood of culture."20 
Change does not automatically place one in a liminal state. To 
14. Id. at 49. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. TuRNER, Morality, supra note 12, at 133-34. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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understand the analogy to indicative or subjunctive moods, contrast 
characterizations of life in post-Soviet Ukraine with the perennial 
metaphorical space of American change, the frontier. Whether for 
pioneers in covered wagons, astronauts in spaceships, or scientists 
on the verge of a new discovery, life on the American frontier is 
emphatically in the indicative. This is real life, actual, exciting. Since 
the Soviet Union dissolved, Ukraine has been described as a state in 
"transition" or as an "emerging economy." Rather than occupying 
the defined space of a frontier, its limits are fuzzy. The point of 
departure is specified - Ukraine is "post-Soviet," "post-Socialist." 
Life in this transitional state is, if nothing else, life in the perpetual 
subjunctive. 
Turner might not be surprised by the nostalgia for Soviet times 
that social scientists note surging through post-Soviet subjects,21 
given their long stay in a liminal phase and its state of potentiality. 
"Actuality, in the liminal state, gives way to possibility, and 
aberrant possibilities reveal once more to luminaries the value of 
what has hitherto been regarded as the somewhat tedious daily 
round."22 The tedious daily round can also be considered the good 
old days; some Ukrainians labeled "pro-Russian" might be more 
aptly described as "nostalgically Soviet." 
Even post-Soviet Ukrainians, who are decidedly not nostalgic 
for a Soviet past, express distaste for liminality. Ukrainian writer 
Yuri Androkhovych's exchange with a Spanish interviewer is a 
telling example. From the start, Andrukhovych' s attempt to make a 
straightforward statement about his European influences is tripped 
up by myriad changing forms, altered states and toponyms 
unavoidably tangling up a simple sentence. "[L]ike all intellectuals 
in his country," Andrukhovych is "crazy about everything 
European. 'My literary references are European. Paul Celan [a 
'German' writer] was born in Chernivtsi, a town that was Romanian 
at the time and subsequently became Ukrainian. There are several 
towns that have changed state or name over the years."'23 
Andrukhovych takes changing forms in stride. His own hometown 
21. See, e.g., SVETLANA BOYM, THE FUTURE OF NOSTALGIA (Basic Books 2001). 
22. TURNER, Variations, supra note 12, at 49. 
23. Xavi Ayen, The Europeanism of Ukrainian Writers, LA VANGUARDIA, Oct. 18, 
2006 [hereinafter Ayen, Ukrainian Writers]. On Chemivtsi, its variability, and its 
role in European sociology of law, see Monica Eppinger, Governing in the Vernacular: 
Eugen Ehrlich and Late Habsburg Ethnography, in LMNG LAW: RECONSIDERING EUGEN 
EHRLICH 21-48 (Marc Hertogh, ed., Hart Publishing Limited 2009). 
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changed from the Austro-Hungarian Stanyslaviv to the Soviet 
Ivano-Frankovsk and then to the Ukrainian Ivano-Frankivsk.24 
Similarly, nearby Austrian Lemberg became Soviet Lvov and is now 
Ukrainian Lviv. But even in this Cheshire-cat zoo of changing 
forms, Andrukhovych clearly objects to some categorizations of his 
world: "For us, it was dramatic that an author like Samuel 
Huntington should draw a categorical frontier between East and 
West. According to him, we are a border zone between what is and 
is not Europe, a sort of limbo land stretched between two worlds."25 
In referencing liminality, then, I do not side those who would 
conceptually place Ukraine in a limbo land, consign it to a border 
zone at the edge of Europe, or make of it a new "buffer state" 
between NATO and the East. Recall that liminality, though 
employing a spatial metaphor, is actually a temporal term: 
liminality refers to a time of mid-transition. It is not a space and its 
subjects are assumed to be in motion. In order to avoid confusion 
or offense, for a spatial locator, we could borrow a metaphor from 
American law, the penumbra. In U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence, 
certain freedoms or privileges are held to exist by virtue of a certain 
relationship to a Constitutional right or guarantee.26 Put another 
way, certain Constitutional guarantees depend on the realization of 
other freedoms to give the guarantees "life and substance,"27 or, in 
Turner's terms, actuality. These freedoms protected by virtue of 
their relation to core enumerated rights are said to exist "in the 
penumbra" of those rights. The penumbra, then, is a zone of 
permitted or enabled practices that exist by virtue of a relationship 
to rights, guarantees, or laws enumerated in written documents 
issued by the appropriate authoritative body. 
Does Ukraine stand in the penumbra of Europe? An empirical 
investigation into whether this designation is apt might examine the 
jurisdiction of Europe. European integration may be understood in 
part as a project of harmonizing laws and behavior shaped by 
laws.28 I propose that European integration in the domain of law 
24. For treatment of this transposition of the local, see YURI ANDRUKHOVYCH, 
DESORIENTATSIYA NA MISTSEVOSTI [DISORIENTATION IN PLACE] (2006). 
25. A yen, Ukrainian Writers, supra note 23. 
26. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965) ("specific guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that 
help give them life and substance"). 
27. Id. 
28. For a theoretical stance that might regard such projects or claims with 
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and law-abiding behavior is achieved, even beyond the formal 
bounds of the European Union, if EU regulation creates areas 
outside the formal boundaries of the Union in which behaviors 
harmonize themselves with the European. How far beyond the 
borders of the EU do EU regulations regulate? How much 
European integration is achieved by EU policy decisions beyond the 
jurisdiction of the EU? 
One concrete example, biofuels policy, provides some insight. 
Consider the transformed landscape of north central Ukraine; in 
only one season it shifted from its traditional dull brownish palette 
of wheat to the almost fluorescent yellow of rapeseed. Neon yellow 
now stretches to the horizon. A manager in the K yiv office of 
Monsanto, one of the leading international marketers of seed in 
Ukraine, explains that Ukrainians began to cultivate rapeseed 
primarily for EU biofuel use. Rapeseed cultivation on any scale only 
started in 2004 and by 2006, there were 600,000 hectares devoted to 
rapeseed (especially winter rape; but also some Canola spring 
rape).29 What set off this change? New EU mandates required that 
member countries contribute a certain amount of raw material for 
biofuel. Consequently, the Lithuanian government purchased part 
of its quota directly from Ukrainian farmers; German farmers grew 
their own, but German oil presses then needed substitute oilseeds, 
which they purchased from Ukrainian growers.30 The director of 
"Agrimatko," a seed franchise in Kherson, a small city deep in the 
southern Ukraine wheat belt, told me in 2006, 
[t]here's a boom this year in rapeseed and com because of 
biodiesel. It's huge. Everyone switched this year. You (the U.S.) 
already have plants [kombinat] that convert corn to fuel. We may 
here, someday. But even before we do, biofuel in Europe is 
raising our prices. Prices for rapeseed and corn are up 100% from 
last year. If you could get $50/ha from them last year, this year 
you get $100.31 
skepticism, see LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A 
MOUNTAIN ZAPOTEC VILLAGE (Stanford University Press 1990). 
29. Interview with Nikolay Vidkritiy, Director of Ecological Permitting, 
Monsanto Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine (Dec.12, 2006). 
30. Interview with Stephan Kresse, agricultural attache, German Embassy, in 
Kyiv, Ukraine (Feb. 19, 2007). 
31. Interview with Ihor Molodiy, Director of southern Ukraine distribution for 
agricultural supplier Agrimatko, in Kherson, Ukraine Oune 7, 2006). 
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Where Westerners might take such interconnectedness for granted, 
this direct effect of European policies upon their landscape is, for 
Ukrainians, a startling and post-Iron-Curtain experience. 
The concepts of liminality and penumbra give us some insight 
into the reference states of time and place in contemporary Ukraine. 
Let us reconsider the pervasiveness of the "evro" referent. In some 
respects, Ukrainians are living "as if" they were in Europe: 
undertaking Evroremont, buying eyeglass frames of Evrostyle, 
buying chicken from the Evrogrill. During life in a liminal state, 
even someone living in the subjunctive is living "as-if" ... 
something. For most Ukrainians, the aspirational referent is Europe. 
In other respects, those very same Ukrainians are already 
undertaking projects, shaping practices, and internalizing 
regulations and standards framed in Europe. They are growing 
rapeseed to fulfill EU policies, and producing crops to European 
regulations and specifications. They already live by Evrostandardti. 
This is life in the indicative mood, the state of actuality instead of 
potentiality. In some respects, then, in the as-if and what-if life of 
the liminal phase, Europe is the aspirational referent.32 In other 
respects, Europe casts the shadow under which actual life in 
Ukraine already carries out its everyday performances. Data on 
some current practices support the proposition that Ukrainians 
already live in the penumbra of Europe. 
Liminiality is a space of open possibility, but that does not 
necessarily imply its burdens are lighter. In fact, it can be grinding. 
Ukrainians might nod knowingly at Turner's description that those 
in the liminal space 
may be said to be in a process of being ground down into a sort of 
homogenous social matter, in which possibilities of differentiation 
may still be glimpsed, then later positively refashioned into 
specific shapes compatible with their new postliminal duties and 
rights as incumbents of a new status and state. The grinding­
down process is accomplished by ordeals: circumcision, 
32. Perhaps a Ukrainian predisposition for a certain frame of reference for this 
imaginary was prefigured by the "imaginary West" familiar to the Soviet 
mentalscape. Certainly, my work on this post-Soviet imaginary is indebted to 
Alexei Yurchak's research into the "imaginary West" of the late Soviet period. See 
ALEXEI YURCHAK, EVERYrHING WAS FOREVER, UNTIL IT WAS No MORE: THE LAST SoVIET 
GENERATION (Princeton University Press 2006), especially chapter 5, Imaginary West, 
the Elsewhere of Late Socialism, 158-206. 
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subincision, clitoridectomy, hazing ... and the like.33 
The ordeals of being "in transition," of being post-Soviet and 
pre-something else, seem to have come in successive waves, each 
one faithlessly promising the end is nigh. The promises, expressed 
implicitly and explicitly by Western governments and investors, 
read: if only you allow multiple parties; introduce a new currency; 
draft a new Constitution; end collective ownership; privatize 
property; and so forth and so on, then will you accomplish 
transition. It turns out each step is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition. The heterogenous group of those who have interested 
themselves in the reformation of post-Soviet Ukraine - Western 
donor governments, international financial institutions, legions of 
(sometimes merely hypothetical) foreign direct investors - have 
always had one more item on the to-do list. Referring to the series 
of ordeals as "transition" is not an empirical statement of fact. It is, 
rather, a performative speech act34 whose felicity is as yet 
unconfirmed. Affixing the label "transition" does have several 
effects (that Austin would call "perlocutionary"35). It induces 
Ukrianian parliamentarians and executive branch officials, and the 
academics who assist them, to take the next trudging step, and it 
reinforces to the average person that there is a narrative arc to this 
series of profound transformations, with its own internal logic, 
which will sometime lead to a conclusion. 
Liminality is exhausting also because it is a locus of intense, 
sometimes relentless, training. The liminal subject is the target of 
instruction. Reduction, grinding down, is followed by 
reconstruction: "The rebuilding process is by instruction, partly in 
practical skills, partly in tribal esoterica, and proceeds by both 
verbal and nonverbal symbolic means."36 This insight of Turner's 
takes us directly to Ukrainian legal reform and what Ukrainians 
think of that West so actively and directly involved. 
V. Deixis, Liminality and Hegemony 
A large body of data on hegemony and power emerges in my 
33. TuRNER, Variations, supra note 12, at 49-50. 
34. For an explanation of performative speech acts and felicity conditions, see 
JOHN L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (Harvard University Press 1962). 
35. See JOHN L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (Harvard University 
Press 1962). 
36. TuRNER, Variations, supra note 12, at 49-50. 
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research. We will look specifically at two examples: (1) land 
privatization, the act of creating private ownership in real property; 
and (2) drafting a Corporate Code, the overarching law regulating 
activities of new private-sector firms. Land privatization was 
accomplished in a new Land Code passed by the Ukrainian 
parliament in 2001.37 In order to understand hegemony and the 
transplant of legal ideas, I investigated how land privatization, 
including this new law, came about. In brief, agricultural land was 
stripped from collective ownership and placed in private hands 
through a series of legal steps, including a landmark 1999 
presidential decree.38 Commenting on it, one expert told me, "The 
decisive stroke was not the privatization of land ownership. It was 
the outlawing of collective ownership."39 According to the lead 
agricultural expert for the U.S. Agency for International 
Development ("USAID") Kyiv mission (himself a Canadian), the 
1999 decree resulted from the work of several actors: the Iowa State 
Agricultural Project; a USAID contractor, Ronco; the U.S. Embassy; 
and the I.M.F. ("back when it still imposed detailed 
conditionalities"). The most important, consistent leading actor was 
the USAID Kyiv Mission itself. "We [USAID] weren't nothing in 
this - we wrote the thing [the decree]," he told me.40 Other players 
included the International Finance Corporation ("IFC") in Donetsk 
and the British aid organization, "but," said the USAID agricultural 
expert, "AID pushed the hardest."41 Similarly, in regard to urban 
real estate, "the USAID Commercial Law Project wrote the 
Mortgage Law that passed in 2004."42 So goes the history to create 
37. Land Code of Ukraine, 2001 Laws No. 2905-III (adopted Oct. 25, 2001, 
signed by President Kuchma Nov. 13, 2001, and published in Uryadovy Kur'yer 
[Government Courier, the official reporter of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine] 
Nov. 15, 2001). 
38. Pro Nevidkladni Zakhodi shchodo Priskorennya Reformuvannya 
Ahramoho Sektora Ekonorniki {flpo Heei,!U(JlanHi 3axoni �ono flpHcKopeHHa 
Pe<j>opM)'eaHHa ArpapHoro CeKTopa EKOHOMiKH) (On the Uninvested Means 
concerning Accelerating Reform of the Agrarian Sector of the Economy) Decree of 
the President of Ukraine No. 1529/99 of Dec. 3, 1999 reprinted in 3AKOHO,[(ABCTBO 
YKPAIHl1 IlPo 3EMJIIO {LEGISLATION OF UKRAINE ON LAND), 85 (Kiev: Urinkom Inter, 
2002). 
39. Interview with Bohdan Nezgrabniy, Director of Agricultural Reforms, 
USAID Kyiv Mission (Apr. 16, 2007). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. The mortgage law referred to is Pro Ipoteku (Ilpo IrroTeey) (On 
Mortgages), 2003 Law of Ukraine 898-IV (adopted June 5, 2003, entry into force Jan. 
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private property and a secondary market for real property, at least 
through the donors' telling. 
These programs were part of a gargantuan effort to reform 
Ukraine. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and because of its 
perceived geostrategic importance, Ukraine became the object of a 
massive amount of attention from enormously funded Western 
assistance projects.43 By the late 1990s, Ukraine was the target of the 
largest amount of U.S. assistance in the world, following only 
Camp-David mandated assistance to Israel and Egypt.44 In these 
projects, money flows from Western governments to Western 
organizations and Western personnel; assistance finally reaches 
Ukraine in the form of "advice" from "experts." We [in the West] 
helped them. Here, we had knowledge; there, they needed re­
forming. Here, we were the inheritors of stable forms; there, they 
were the unexpecting recipients of rupture. It was up to the West to 
pass forms, and stability (in our image), on to them. To Ukrainians 
the grinding down and the instruction grind on. 
Clearly, seen in this respect, paying attention to deictics and 
liminality attunes us to power differentials and power plays. Who 
has the questions, and who, the answers, are indicators of power 
structuring discourse. Likewise, analysis of discourses of inclusion 
and exclusion takes us to the ground of hegemony. Hegemony does 
not operate on autopilot, though. When we recognize it, we should 
not suspend inquiry by assuming too much about the trajectory of 
hegemonic practices after they are launched. 
On one hand, as the USAID agricultural expert described, we 
see a heavy-handed intervention, a very direct version of legal 
transplanting, in which the West in various institutions is actually 
1, 2004). 
43. For an account of Western assistance in Eastern Europe, see JANINE WEDEL, 
COLLISION AND COLLUSION: THE STRANGE CASE OF WESTERN AID TO EASTERN EUROPE 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2001). 
44. See, e.g., Review of U.S. Assistance Programs to Russia, Ukraine, and the New 
Independent States: Hearing before the House Comm. on International Relations March 
26, 1998, 105th Cong. 49-337 (1998) (statements of Ambassador Richard 
Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Assistance 
to the New Independent States and Coordinator of Assistance to the New 
Independent States, Department of State, and Don Pressley, Acting Assistant 
Administrator for Europe and the New Independent States, U.S. Agency for 
International Development) available at http://comrndocs.house.gov/ committees/ 
intlrel/hfa49337.000/hfa49337 _Of.htm. 
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drafting decrees and laws reshaping basic framework institutions. 
On the other hand, from other reports, we see power relations 
twisted in a different way. Another Western adviser, funded and 
sent by the U.S. government in response to Ukrainian government 
pleas for help after the Orange Revolution, recalls a series of long 
meetings he held with then-Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov. 
Zerkalo Nedeli, a well-regarded Ukrainian newspaper, had just run 
an article exposing an entity that "negotiated" Ukrainian purchases 
from Russia as essentially a non-transparent rent-collector. The 
Western adviser told the Prime Minister that the entity yielded no 
discernible value to Ukraine and existed for the sole purpose of 
skimming off Ukrainian taxpayer money destined for the Russian 
seller under contracts whose terms are never disclosed to the public. 
This arrangement, by the way, did not affect the U.S. directly. These 
were not, for example, funds that otherwise would have gone to 
U.S. vendors or contracts for goods which U.S. firms could have 
supplied. The advice in this case was rendered in a good-faith 
analysis of how to eliminate dead-weight loss from the strapped 
Ukrainian government budget. The adviser's primary advice was to 
cut the entity out of the process; the Prime Minister's response was 
smiling and nodding. This, the adviser later learned, occurred 
during precisely the same period Yekhanurov was meeting with 
principals of the disdained entity, in meetings that yielded 
prolongation of its involvement.45 
Hegemony? Who's gaming whom? I was reminded of this on 
a less grand scale when I interviewed the open and energetic 
director of an agricultural cooperative in Crimea. The co-op was a 
"recollectivization" of farmers who had received their land plots 
three years earlier. I asked him why they formed the co-op. He 
answered, "Because the UN had a program of providing advice 
[and perhaps credit] available only to ag coops; so we formed a co­
op so we could get the advice. But the co-op's working ok, so 
maybe we'll keep it going."46 These practices show a relation to "the 
West," the outsider, or the potential power that defies predictions 
based on a basic read of power asymmetries. What do we call the 
feint in the face of hegemony, a feint that might be constitutive? 
45. Interview with Eric Mukden, adviser to the Ukrainian government Ouly 30, 
2007). 
46. Interview with Viktor Metushchenko, director of Armyan village 
cooperative Oune 9, 2007). 
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Another set of data that defies expectations of hegemony as a 
frame for practices of submission or dominance can be analyzed 
under the heading of a Ukrainian perception of the West as a 
resource. My research shows Ukrainians using the West as a 
resource in a variety of interesting ways. For example, consider a 
property dispute over a 1,000-year-old church on the edge of Kyiv, 
home of the oldest intact icons in Russian Orthodoxy. Church 
leaders (Ukrainian but Russian Orthodox under the authority of the 
Moscow patriarchate) alleged that the frescoes and paintings were 
not iconic enough and intimated the correct course would be to 
paint over them.47 In this dispute, Ukrainian preservationists relied 
on the West as a source of outrage, attention, and protection from 
internal sources of harm.48 
A Ukrainian parliamentarian described using the West during a 
particularly violent battle over checks and balances with the 
executive branch of the Ukrainian government. Then-President 
Kuchma had ordered a hit on a gadfly journalist by the security 
forces, which made the journalist's death look like the act of 
common criminals. The President then tried to intimidate and 
threaten any in the legislature who investigated the death or 
proposed accountability for executive-branch wrongdoing. During 
this incident, Ukrainian parliamentarians relied on the West, 
especially Europe, as a source of outrage, attention, and protection -
as an audience in front of whom the Ukrainian elite were capable of 
feeling shame - from internal sources of harm. Parliamentarians 
report that statements by the Vienna Commission were particularly 
helpful in protecting opposition leaders and keeping safe those who 
would build a movement for accountability.49 
The West is also seen as a source of funding, record-keeping 
practices, and personnel for accomplishing basic goals of 
governance by cash-strapped government institutions. "Our 
experience in working on legislative drafting [with the Ministry of 
Justice and other executive-branch agencies] is any department you 
take has four people, maximum. That leads to the fact that they are 
47. Interview with Father Dohlyadachniy, Russian Orthodox (Moxcow 
Patriarchate) priest (Oct. 30, 2007). 
48. Interview with Irina Spromozhna, Deputy Director for Scholarly Research at 
the St. Sophia National Museum complex (Nov. 26, 2007). 
49. Telephone interview Ihor Pryamoyevych, supra note 1. 
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the least aware people in terms of keeping records or statistics."so 
The Ministry of Justice used Western NGOs and USAID and EU 
contractors as a source of needed capacity to fulfill basic functions: 
to gather data, analyze statistics, and generate reports upon which 
the Ministry relied for making policy and struggling over resources. 
How many court cases are seen per week, per judge? These are the 
kinds of mundane details upon which budget requests rely, the 
tedious collection of which is outsourced at Western government­
donors' expense to Western organizations. 
Similarly, the West is seen as a source of positive ideas, and the 
money to back them. The Ukrainian Legal Foundation ("U.L.F.") 
began as a largely Canadian-funded think-tank headed by Serhiy 
Holovatiy, a parliamentarian who went on to become Ukraine's 
Minister of Justice.51 The co-director of U.L.F. was Canadian Halyna 
Freeland. Freeland organized trainings for interested Ukrainian 
law-makers in topics germaine to fundamental measures of 
desovietization: setting up laws on freedom of press, conscience, 
and association; government transparency and accountability; and 
multiparty elections. Through U.L.F., she provided research 
resources, fancy (Evroremonted!) office space, and a prestigious 
platform for reformers like Holovatiy. The chair of a highly 
regarded law school in Kyiv told me, 
That's the reason I'm in Kyiv, by the way. I was in Ivano­
Frankivsk [a small city in Western Ukraine], teaching in the law 
school and seeing Holovatiy on t.v. [when they were writing civil 
liberties into the constitution]. I found myself thinking, 'I should 
be working with him. He is doing what the country needs.' So I 
came to Kyiv to work for the Ukrainian Legal Foundation.52 
The office space and the salary, basic enabling elements, for 
those who saw themselves working altruistically for the good of 
their new country was openly provided by the West. 
Another Ukrainian law professor, presently working on a 
50. Interview with Tanya Shchelepnava, Deputy Director of Rule of Law 
Programs, American Bar Association Central and Eastern European Law Initiative 
Kyiv office Oune 21, 2007). 
51. For information on the Ukrainian Legal Foundation, see THE Posr-SovIET 
HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNET RESOURCFS 
(University of Washington Press 1999) (1996). See also http:/ /www.civilsoc.org/ 
nisorgs/ukraine/kyiv /lglfnd.htrn. 
52. Interview with Myroslava Adamovych, Chair of Law Faculty, Kyiv Mohyla 
Academy (Apr. 13, 2007). 
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committee drafting a new Corporate Code, related his experience 
with Western legal advising. An American law professor, funded 
through Western government aid programs, came to help his 
committee. Several years ago, "he drafted us a beautiful Code, just 
beautiful. But he left it with us. Now that our committee has 
worked on it for five years, it's a total mess. Poor Professor X. We 
ruined his code. Now it's just a disaster."53 Contrast this, and the 
USAID agricultural adviser's report, with the rapeseed revolution. 
If this is "hegemony," it involves something more complicated than 
easily stereotyped domination and resistance. 
The West is seen as a resource in other ways, to balance the 
potentially heavy influence of Russia by Ukrainians who see 
independence as refutation of a colonial legacy that had come to 
Ukraine from the East, not the West. For these Ukrainians, Moscow 
is seen as former (and perhaps future) colonial master. One adviser 
to the Ukrainian President described the efforts of the Russian 
government "to turn imperial leanings into practical political 
measures." What is the antidote? In his words, "Evrostandardti." 
European standards, he suggested, offer alternate forms for social 
integration and action.s4 
Another dimension of this complex dynamic was the subject of 
a presentation to an internal audience of policy professionals at a 
Kyiv institute. A Kyiv professor analyzed how Ukrainians are being 
formed by the outreach of others. Ukrainian airwaves are 
bombarded with commercials and dubbed foreign shows; Ukrainian 
ports are flooded with foreign goods; and Ukrainian consumers are 
created via the messages of Western companies' billboards, 
magazines, movie trailers. Ukrainians understand they are the 
target of a mass attempt from people outside to reach them. An 
almost Althusserian sense of interpellation, of being called, by 
projections of the Other across borders onto Ukrainian space, comes 
through in her analysis. "The Other presents itself to us in 
communications, through trade, via the internet, through 
advertisements." Unexpectedly, the professor expressed the 
perception that practices of mimesis may make the Other like us, 
53. Interview with Anatoliy Spivrotbitniy, law professor and member of 
Corporate Code drafting committee under the parliament of Ukraine (Nov. 17, 
2007). 
54. Ivan Ivanchenko, Professor at Ukrainian Institute for Policy and adviser to 
President Yushchenko on Social Policy, Address on "Corporatized Society and 
Corruption," at Ukrainian Institute for Policy, Kyiv, Ukraine Ouly 17, 2007). 
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rather than vice versa. "If I consume this fast food, this good, they'll 
be like me," is how the she put it. (Note how she framed it, "They'll 
be like me," not, "I'll be like them.") The ambivalence inherent in 
relationships with a West which may itself channel hegemonic 
power relations or provide resources for reshaping internal or 
regional power dynamics came through clearly in the wistful 
realism of her conclusion that, " A meeting with 'the Other' does not 
happen 'ne konfliktniy,"' that is, "without conflict."55 
VI. Time and Transitions 
Anthropologist Benjamin Whorf, discussing Edward Sapir' s 
hypothesis on the relationship between language and cognition, 
suggests we recognize the influence language has on other activities, 
cultural and personal, in its constant ways of arranging data.56 
Whorf' s paradigmatic example is European languages' use of spatial 
metaphors for non-spatial concepts like time. Time is conceived as 
running in a straight line. The future lies ahead of us; the past, 
behind. Language so organizes data through metaphor and 
categorization that we are not even aware of this as an 
organizational metaphor. It becomes the framing for our lived 
experience, part of our reality. Whorf's particular example about 
spatial metaphor organizing the experience of time led me to an 
insight about a contemporary Ukrainian experience of the West. 
I propose that liminality is yet one more example of the elision 
Whorf points out. The limen, the threshold, a spatial term, becomes 
the name for a period of time. Ukrainians', and others', discourse 
on the post-Soviet experience presumes liminality. In other words, 
it presumes that there will be a stable state to reach at the end of this 
so-called transition period. Referring to the post-Soviet period as a 
transition, the economy as "emerging," uses imagery of moving 
through space, liminal space, as metaphor for moving through a 
certain period of time. 
This takes us back to deictics, those context-dependent 
linguistic expressions. In a time of rapid social change under 
55. Oksana Ilyich, professor at Ukrainian Institute for Policy, Address on "The 
Strategic Stance towards The Other in Formation of Interests," at Ukrainian 
Institute for Policy, Kyiv, Ukraine Ouly 17, 2007). 
56. Benjamin Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language 
[1947], in LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND SocIETY: A BOOK OF READINGS 64, 64 (Ben E. 
Blount ed., Waveland Press 1995) (1974). 
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conditions of discursive rupture such as the transition in Ukraine, 
the use of deictics reveals some of the concepts and referents in 
motion. When I asked Ihor, the former parliamentarian, what 
Ukrainians think of the West, he answered through temporal 
framing. "What a Ukrainian thinks of 'Europe' depends on his or 
her strategic choice. Where do they see their future?"57 In his 
answer, Europe is not only a place, it is the repository for a time. 
What Ukrainians think of "the West" has changed as their own 
locational referents and anticipated futures became untethered. 
Europe, in the Soviet mental geography and use of the word, used 
to be "over there." Now, for post-Soviet Ukrainians, "Europe" is 
"then" (noTiM, potim), a way of conceptualizing the future.58 Here, 
the liminal space is a space of the subjunctive and not the indicative, 
the space of possibilities. 
Ukrainians are exhausted with the post-Soviet "transition" in 
part because although it has a well-defined starting point, the end 
seems to recede in the distance the more "reforms" Ukrainians 
subject themselves to. Social changes initiated by legal transplants 
have been massive, fundamental, and relentless for the last two 
decades. Turner's words could be taken as a warning: "[P]assing 
from dynamics to statics, [liminality] may cease to be a mere 
transition and become a set way of life, a state, that of the anchorite 
or monk."59 Has liminality ceased to be a transition and instead 
become its own way of life for post-Soviet Ukrainians? (Or, was 
"transition" a fiction by implying a non-existent endpoint in the first 
place?) Will there ever be a "new normal?" Where, oh where, is the 
Europe at the end of the rainbow? 
VII. Whither Europe? 
Ukraine is a country with a divided public; many are not "pro­
Westem." In their collective imagination of a future, "Europe" 
functions for some Ukrainians as a standard of material comfort to 
be achieved, but otherwise as an entity from which to differentiate. 
57. Telephone interview with Ihor Pryamoyevych, (Dec. 26, 2008). 
58. This distinguishes the orientation of Ukrainians from some other post­
Socialist central Europeans for whom "Europe" is (or was) a destination of 
"return," a re-connection to a seemingly lost past. See, e.g., KATHERINE VERDERY 
Civil Society or Nation? "Europe" in the Symbolism of PostSocialist Politics, in WHAT 
WASSocIALISM, AND WHAT COMES NEXT? 104 (Princeton University Press 1996). 
59. Turner, Variations, supra note 12, at 49. 
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However, for many others, Europe functions as the imaginary outer 
right bracket of this liminal space, as "the future," a comforting 
imaginary endpoint to the process of transition and a collective with 
which to identify in an unanticipated process of nation-building. 
In the present, "Europe" is a frame for the performance of being 
European.60 The concept of penumbra allows us to see and study 
effects of law and regulation without restricting our gaze to 
jurisdictional boundaries. For Ukrainian farmers planting rape 
seed, it is immaterial whether they stand in a shadow or at the heart 
of Europe. Their daily activities are formed by goals no longer 
Soviet, nor experimentally post-Soviet. They are European. For 
many Ukrainians, then, in the sense of everyday experience, 
Ukraine is already part of Europe. Even within this actuality, 
however, potentiality also moves. Europe becomes a goal, a point in 
the future towards which a messy and uncertain present is moving. 
And in this, too, it functions to structure performance and affect in 
the present. 
The 2006 Prize for European Understanding of the Leipzig Book 
Fair went to Ukrainian novelist Yuri Andrukhovych. In his 
acceptance speech, he referred to the terrible cost borne by Ukraine 
in the last century in which it was the battered and bloodied frontier 
between mutually antagonistic West and East. Andrukhovych 
plead, "It is crucially important for me that you help this cursed 
country." He chastised the EU commissioner on record as opposing 
Ukraine's eventual entry into the EU and poignantly appealed to all 
Europeans, "[I]t wouldn't be so terribly difficult for you to help this 
country. It would simply be a matter of not saying anything that 
will kill our hope."61 
Why is "Europe" such a pervasive referent in Ukraine? In large 
part because of anxiety over the detachment from the former stable 
cultural forms. Fixation with "Europe" gives an endpoint to the 
current indeterminate and difficult state; to use Turner's three-stage 
description, by postulating an end stage, a set of stable forms to 
which the reformed Ukraine will become attached, Ukrainians can 
imagine that they are in a middle stage, a liminal state, and that this 
60. On performance and everyday life, see ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION 
OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Doubleday 1959). 
61. Yuri Andrukhovych, Address on receiving the 2006 Prize for European 
Understanding at the Leipzig Book Fair, reprinted in SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Mar. 
16, 2006. 
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condition is transitory. Becoming "European" is a teleological goal, 
a mappable geographical destination for life in the liminal 
subjunctive. It is a practical answer to everyday questions, prior 
answers to which disappeared with the Soviet system. In this sense, 
"Europe" is the converse of "Communism." Soviet Ukrainians 
worked, in the actuality of lived experience, in a well-established set 
of everyday tasks and performances towards a taken-for-granted 
future that existed (yet) nowhere, Communism. Post-Soviet 
Ukrainians move, through an as-if present continually subject to 
experimentation and change, towards a not-taken-for-granted future 
that does exist, just to the West, already. "Way over there" has 
come all the way up to the border and become the new future, the 
new "potim [noTiM]" the new "then." The mood is subjunctive more 
than optative; the affective structure could not be characterized as 
optimistic, but within one discerns a wary hope. 
